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evidence has become a topic generating substantial discussion 
in theoretical and descriptive linguistics. For instance, the University 
of  Tübingen in Germany organizes a biannual conference entitled 
“linguistic evidence” since 2004. The conference describes itself  in the 
call for papers for the 2014 conference as “a meeting place for linguists 
who wish to improve the empirical adequacy of  linguistic theory and 
linguistic analysis.” and aims to “more closely integrate data-driven and 
theory-driven approaches”1
Implicit in this description is the view that the empirical adequacy 
of  linguistic theory is open to improvement because the theory has 
QRWSDLGVXIÀFLHQWDWWHQWLRQWRWKHDFFHVVLEOHOLQJXLVWLFHYLGHQFHGDWD
also several recent journal contributions focus on the methodology of  
collecting evidence to address questions in linguistic theory. I discuss 
1 http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/forschung/forschungsschwerpunkte/sonderforschungsbereiche
/sfb-833/ev/le2014/call-for-papers.html, accessed aug. 2, 2014
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below a debate concerning evidence in theoretical syntax and semantics 
focusing on english data (GIBSOn and FedOrenkO, 2010, 2013; 
SPrOUSe and alMeIdaM, 2013; SPrOUSe et al. 2013), but also 
WZRUHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHGFRQWULEXWLRQVRQWKHPHWKRGRORJ\RI ÀHOGZRUN
(MaTThewSOn, 2004; dIxOn, 2007). I hope to show that despite 
all the discussion within linguistics, the same view towards evidence used 
in the established sciences can also be applied in linguistics. SaGan 
(1980) aptly phrased this principle as I quote it in the title of  this paper: 
“extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. 
0\ SDSHU LV VWUXFWXUHG LQWR WKUHH VHFWLRQV ,Q WKH ÀUVW VHFWLRQ ,
articulate some general principle relating to evidence. In particular, I 
show the Sagan’s principle has been the common view of  the relationship 
between theoretical claims and empirical evidence for centuries dating 
back at least to hUMe (1748). The second part of  my title is in 
parenthesis (“and ordinary ones require ordinary evidence”) because it 
remains an implicature in Sagan’s formulation. But I show that it has 
been understood as part of  the principle since the beginning. I then 
provide a suggestion of  how to understand the terms “extraordinary” 
and “ordinary” within Sagan’s principle on the basis of  prior likelihoods 
and the cost of  mistakes: an extraordinary claim is one likely to cause 
high costs in the case of  a mistake. In the second section, I review a 
recent debate concerning the sources of  evidence for the study of  
well-studied languages (GIBSOn & FedOrenkO, 2010; SPrOUSe 
& alMeIda, 2013), and show that the outcome of  the debate has 
essentially been Sagan’s principle. In the second part, I review recent 
contributions on the methodology of  the study of  less well studied 
languages, especially by dIxOn (2007) and MaTThewSOn (2004), 
and point out some weaknesses of  dixon’s text-only method. But 
while I agree with Matthewson's inclusive approach for most cases, 
I show that there are cases where one should call upon experimental 
HYLGHQFHVSHFLÀFDOO\,GLVFXVVMaTThewSOn’S own (2006) work on 
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presuppositionality in Salish as a case in point. Instead of  dixon and 
0DWWKHZVRQÀHOGZRUN VSHFLÀFPHWKRGRORJLHV , SURSRVH WKDW 6DJDQ·V
principle should be applied as a guideline for the study of  less well 
studied languages as well. This entails that both evidence from traditional 
ÀHOGZRUNWHFKQLTXHVDVZHOODVHYLGHQFHIURPH[SHULPHQWDOWHFKQLTXHV
have a role to play. For many questions, though, a combination of  
HVWDEOLVKHG ÀHOGZRUN WHFKQLTXHV ZLWK SURSHU GRFXPHQWDWLRQ XVLQJ
modern recording technologies is most appropriate as the main source of  
HYLGHQFH,QWKHÀQDOVHFWLRQ,FRQFOXGHZLWKVRPHSUDFWLFDOVXJJHVWLRQV
for when to incorporate formal experiments to gather quantitative 
HYLGHQFHLQV\QWDFWLFDQGVHPDQWLFÀHOGZRUN
 $3KLORVRSK\RI 6FLHQFH%ULHÀQJ
 6DJDQ·V3ULQFLSOHDQGLWV,PSOLFDWXUH
7KH ÀUVW SDUW RI P\ WLWOH LV D TXRWH IURP WKH SK\VLFLVW SaGan 
(1980): “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” In the 
title, I furthermore articulate an implicature of  Sagan’s principle, namely 
that ordinary claims require only ordinary evidence. In this section, I 
argue that the Sagan’s principle as well the implicature I added are an 
established tenet of  the philosophy of  science dating back to at least 
hUMe (1748). I furthermore consider how it can be applied to evidence 
in linguistics.
,ÀUVW VKRZ WKDW 6DJDQ·VSULQFLSOH LV DFWXDOO\ URRWHGGHHSO\ LQ WKH
history of  science. I quote Sagan’s principle here from a science Tv 
program Sagan appeared in. while Sagan’s phrasing is widely quoted and 
original to Sagan, it is also well-known that the underlying principle is 
much older than Sagan’s formulation of  it. Two much older formulations 
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of  essentially the same principle are due to hUMe (1748) and laPlaCe 
(1814). Two relevant quotes from section 10 of  hUMe’S (1748) book 
are “a wise man ... proportions his belief  to the evidence” and “no 
WHVWLPRQ\LVVXIÀFLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKDPLUDFOHXQOHVVWKHWHVWLPRQ\EHRI 
such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact 
which it endeavors to establish.” hume calls the latter quote a “general 
maxim worthy of  our attention”, so we might also use the term hume’s 
maxim instead of  Sagan’s principle. a second, early relevant quote is the 
following from the French scientist laPlaCe (1814: p. 50): “Qu’it ne 
serait pas philosphique de nier les phénomènes, uniquement parce qu’ils 
sont inexplicable dans l’état actuel de nos connaissances. Seulement, 
nous devons les examiner avec une attention d’autant plus scrupuleuse, 
TX·LOSDUDvWSOXVGLIÀFLOHGHOHVDGPHWWUHµ´,WZRXOGQRWEHSKLORVRSK\
to deny phenoma solely because they are inexplicable according to the 
present state of  knowledge. But we ought to examine them with an 
DWWHQWLRQDOOWKHPRUHVFUXSXORXVDVLWDSSHDUVPRUHGLIÀFXOWWRDGPLW
them.”) wIkIPedIa (2014b) reports that FlOUrnOy (1899) 
reformulated laplace’s principle as: “The weight of  the evidence should 
be proportioned to the strangeness of  the facts.”, which might have 
inspired the more modern formulation of  Sagan. The quotations show 
that Sagan’s principle is an old principle of  science.
Consider now the implicature of  Sagan’s principle that ordinary claims 
require only ordinary evidence. In hume’s and Sagan’s formulations, the 
implicature I added in the title is not made explicit. Conditionals “If  p 
then q” are well known in the linguistic literature to trigger an implicature 
“If  not p then not q”, also referred to as conditional perfection (GeIS & 
ZwICky, 1971 and others). For example the recommendation “If  it’s 
raining, you should take an umbrella” implicates that if  it’s not raining, 
you shouldn’t take an umbrella. Sagan’s principle is just an elegant 
formulation of  the conditional “if  you make an extraordinary claim, 
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you must present extraordinary evidence for it.” So, it implicates that 
ordinary claims require only ordinary evidence. The same holds for the 
second quote from hume above: The statement that no evidence except 
IRUDYHU\VWURQJNLQGLVVXIÀFLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKDPLUDFOHLPSOLFDWHVWKDW
WKHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDW·VOHVVWKDQYHU\VWURQJEXWVXIÀFLHQWWRHVWDEOLVK
a non-miracle. actually both hUMe (1748) and SaGan (1980) had a 
reason to leave the implicature implicit: The quotes of  hume’s are from a 
chapter on miracles, so hume was focussing on the case of  extraordinary 
claims. a similarly reason applies to Sagan’s quote. The Sagan quote is 
inspired by the rather similar phrase “an extraordinary claim requires 
extraordinary proof ” by the sociologist TrUZZI (1978) according to 
wIkIPedIa (2014a). while I have no opinion on whether Sagan was 
actually quoting Truzzi, it is of  interest to the present argument that 
both Sagan and Truzzi were fellow founders of  the Committee for the 
6FLHQWLÀF ,QYHVWLJDWLRQRI &ODLPVRI  WKH3DUDQRUPDO*LYHQ WKLV IDFW
it makes sense for both of  them to omit the implicature concerning 
RUGLQDU\ FODLPV EHFDXVH DOO FODLPV RI  SDUDQRUPDOLW\ DUH E\ GHÀQLWLRQ
H[WUDRUGLQDU\7KHÀUVW+XPHTXRWHDQGDOVR/DSODFH·VDQG)ORXUQR\·V
formulations are explicit about the implicature since they speak of  a 
proportional relation between the evidence furnished and the claim that 
one is sought to establish.
In sum, I showed in this section that Sagan’s principle including 
its implicature are established principles in the philosophy of  sciences. 
however, we still need to determine how to apply the principle to 
linguistic claims and evidence. To be able to do so, we need to understand 
the adjectives “ordinary” and “extraordinary” as applied to linguistic 
claims and evidence. In this next section, I suggest a general Bayesian 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI ERWKWHUPVDQGFRQVLGHUVSHFLÀFDOO\ZKDWWKLVHQWDLOV
for linguistic evidence.
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:KDW·V([WUDRUGLQDU\"7KH&RVWRI (UURUV
To derive any consequences from Sagan’s principle, we need to 
understand what constitutes and ordinary vs. an extraordinary claim and 
similarly what constitutes ordinary and extraordinary evidence. hume’s 
term “miracle” indicates that extraordinary claims are those that we 
believe to be highly unlikely. But, I think we also intuitively understand 
that the cost of  a potential error affects the quality of  the evidence 
we desire: Before you go on an overseas trip, you might check several 
times that you have your passport with you. But you are more likely to 
not check at all that you packed your tooth brush. That this behavior is 
rational at least if  you re are anything as forgetful as me, follows from 
the Bayesian computation linked to the cost of  error. assume that your 
equally likely to not have packed your passport or your toothbrush. But 
the cost of  not having your passport is substantial: you might not be 
DEOH WRERDUG\RXUÁLJKWZLWKRXW LW$QGVLQFHHYHQWKHPHPRU\WKDW
you checked your passport 20 minutes ago might be mistaken, it makes 
sense to expend the energy to check again just to be sure you avoid the 
substantial cost of  error. By comparison, the cost of  not having your 
toothbrush is a lot smaller, so checking whether you have it on you is 
uneconomical -- the error is too inconsequential to be worth the cost. 
The example shows to factors that play a role: the cost of  the test and 
the cost of  an error. a further factor that plays a role is the reliability 
of  a test: Staying with the example, you might check for your passport 
either by quickly feeling through the outside of  your bag that it contains 
a passport sized printed document or you might do a more elaborate, 
but more reliable check: open your bag, take out the passport, open it, 
and check the name and validity of  the passport.
The statisticians neyMan and PearSOn (1928) introduced the 
discussion of  two different type of  error types in testing a hypothesis. 
a type I error occurs when the test comes out in favor of  a hypothesis 
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that’s actually false, while a type II error occurs when the test results 
speaks against a hypothesis that’s actually true. The two types of  errors 
might cause different amounts of  damage. The calculations involved 
in this type of  scenario well understood in the context of  medical tests 
and is discussed in conjunctions with the concepts of  sensitivity and 
VSHFLÀFLW\RI WHVWV)RURXUSXUSRVHVDURXJKXQGHUVWDQGLQJLVVXIÀFLHQW
Consider the case of  a medical test for a condition that has no other 
V\PSWRPV7KHWHVWLWVHOI KDVDVSHFLÀFFRVWWRLWERWKLQWHUPVRI WKH
cost of  carrying out the test and in terms of  the suffering the test itself  
FDXVHV$VVXPHZH IXUWKHUPRUHNQRZ WKDWD VSHFLÀFSHUFHQWDJHRI D
VSHFLÀFSRSXODWLRQKDVWKHFRQGLWLRQLQTXHVWLRQ)LQDOO\ZHNQRZWKH
rates of  the two errors: For the people that actually have the medical 
FRQGLWLRQLQTXHVWLRQWKHWHVWJLYHVDVSHFLÀFUDWHRI 7\SH,,HUURUVRU
false negatives. and for the people that actually don’t have the medical 
FRQGLWLRQWKHWHVWJLYHVDVSHFLÀFUDWHRI 7\SH,HUURUVRUIDOVHSRVLWLYHV
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH WUXH SRVLWLYHV EHQHÀW IURP WUHDWPHQW ZKLOH
for the true negatives only the cost of  the test itself  is incurred. The 
framework of  utility analysis of  von neUMann & MOrGenSTern 
(1944) implies that the test is only useful if  the cost of  the test to an 
LQGLYLGXDOLVVPDOOHUWKDQWKHSRWHQWLDOEHQHÀWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOGUDZVIURP
each of  the four possible outcomes times the possibility of  belonging to 
each of  the four groups. and if  we have to decide between two possible 
tests, we would want the cost increase the more expensive test causes 
WREHVPDOOHU WKDQ WKH WRWDODGGLWLRQDOEHQHÀWDQ LQGLYLGXDOJHWV IURP
the pricier test as compared to the cheaper test. Schematically, a test 
with many false positives is more acceptable when the likelihood of  
an actual positive increases or the cost done by treating a false positive 
decreases. and a test with many false negatives is more acceptable when 
the actual rate of  positives is decreased or when the cost a false negative 
is decreased. In medical testing all the precise costs may be known at 
least in approximation: the cost of  the test and the treatment, the cost 
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reduction of  successful treatment compared to not giving treatment to 
affected individuals and also the cost of  the possible side effects of  
treating one of  the false positives. In linguistic examples, the cost of  
a test is generally known in approximation: it’s roughly the cost of  the 
UHTXLUHGÀHOGZRUN%XWWKHEHQHÀWRI DFRUUHFWOLQJXLVWLFWKHRU\RUWKH
cost of  an incorrect linguistic theory are not known. So we can’t really 
determine what rate of  Type I and Type II errors we should tolerate.
In behavioral psychology, researchers have agreed to tolerate 5% of  
7\SH,DQGRI 7\SH,,HUURUV7KHVHYDOXHVDSSO\VSHFLÀFDOO\WRD
scenario of  testing a tested hypothesis that two groups of  measurements 
are drawn from different populations vs. the null hypothesis that the two 
are drawn from two randomly chosen groups of  the same population. 
The 5% and 20% rates correspond to the assumption that there is no 
prior bias as to whether the test hypothesis is correct or not, and but 
that the cost of  publishing a false positive is greater than the cost of  not 
SXEOLVKLQJDIDOVHQHJDWLYHLQWHUPVRI FRVWWRWKHÀHOGRI SV\FKRORJ\
not to the individual researcher). There are many scenarios in linguistics 
DQGDOVRLQOLQJXLVWLFÀHOGZRUNZKHUHWKLVNLQGRI VHWXSLVDSSOLFDEOH
For example, we may compare whether males and females use an overt 
ÀUVWSHUVRQSURQRXQVWDUWLQJIURPWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVWKDWWKHUHLVQR
sex difference. In such a case the run-of-the-mill psychological method 
can be applied to possibly show that there is a sex difference. however, 
LQ OLQJXLVWLFZRUN DQGHVSHFLDOO\ LQ OLQJXLVWLFÀHOGZRUN VLWXDWLRQV DUH
common where the psychological method isn’t applicable. Consider for 
H[DPSOH WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI  D ÀHOGZRUNHUZKRZDQWV WR GHWHUPLQH WKH
word used to describe rabbit in the language of  an indigenous group. 
QUIne (1957) argues that it is close to impossible to conduct even 
such a simple task while strictly applying the method of  behavioral 
SV\FKRORJ\7KHÀHOGZRUNHUZRXOGQHHGWRVHWXSDVHULHVRI FRQWUROOHG
experiments where indigenous speakers observe rabbits vs. some other 
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stimuli to determine that the presence of  rabbits triggers a different 
word from that of  for example foxes and thereby shoot down the 
`null-hypothesis’ that the words for rabbits and foxes is the same in 
the indigenous language. Quine concludes from this argument that 
ÀHOGZRUNFDQQHYHU\LHOGGHWHUPLQDWHUHVXOWVDQGPRUHJHQHUDOO\WKDW
translation is indeterminate, but this result derives in large part from 
Quine’s strict adherence to the behavioral method. Some residual 
XQFHUWDLQW\LVFRPPRQWRDOOVFLHQWLÀFHQGHDYRUVRI FRXUVH%XWWKLVLV
better discussed for medical research, nuclear physics, or the theory of  
HYROXWLRQUDWKHUWKDQOLQJXLVWLFÀHOGZRUN$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHÀHOG
ZRUNHUKDV D MXVWLÀHGSULRUEHOLHI  WKDW WKHSHUFHSWXDORUJDQV DQG WKH
mental faculties of  the indigenous groups do not substantially from 
WKRVHRI RWKHUKXPDQV:K\WKHQVKRXOGWKHÀHOGZRUNHUVWDUWZLWKWKH
null-hypothesis that the indigenous group should lack a term for rabbit 
if  rabbits occur frequently in the environment the indigenous group 
occupies? a different kind of  starting point would be the hypothesis 
that the indigenous language is not substantially different from other 
previously studied languages including the well-studied european and 
east-asian languages except for the phonetic content of  the lexical 
items. Under this perspective the Type I and II errors are the opposite 
from that of  the Quinean perspective. So if  we accept different rates 
of  the two types of  errors, we arrive at different outcomes. assume we 
accept 20% of  Type II errors. Then, on the Quinean approach up to 
20% of  the claims of  the form “this indigenous group doesn’t have a 
word for x” would be false, while on the latter approach up to 20% of  
the claims of  the form “this indigenous group has a word for x just like 
european languages” would be false.
The previous paragraph I argued that the choice of  a null hypothesis 
is by no means obvious for linguistic research. One approach might 
lead to over-exoticizing the language under study, the other to over-
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(XURSHDQL]LQJLW2YHUH[RWLFL]LQJDULVHVDVIROORZV,I ÀHOGZRUNHUZDV
to generally start from the null hypothesis that an indigenous languages 
ODFNVDVSHFLÀFGLVWLQFWLRQ OLNHWKDWEHWZHHQUDEELWVDQGIR[HVDQGZH
accept a high rate of  false negatives, the indigenous language would end 
up being described as lacking many distinctions better studied languages 
GUDZ %XW RYHU(XURSHDQL]LQJ FRPHV DERXW ZKHQ WKH ÀHOGZRUNHU
starts with the assumption that the indigenous language is similar to 
well-studied languages. Then any false negative corresponds to a claim 
that the language in question has a property of  some well-studied 
language. regardless of  approach, errors are of  course unwanted and 
the expectation is that attempts at replication of  a result are going to 
eliminate errors over time. But some rate of  error is unavoidable in any 
VFLHQWLÀF HQGHDYRU DQG JLYHQ WKDW WKH HUURU RI  RYHU(XURSHDQL]LQJ
is the less dangerous type of  error. In the following, I’ll call this the 
comparison-based approach: the term 2YHU(XURSHDQL]LQJ brings with 
it connotations of  neo-colonialism and cultural imperialism, as well as 
memories of  latinizing the description of  some european languages 
by religious scholars and translators of  the Bible. But in current 
linguistic work, a substantial variety of  languages is quite well-described 
so the connotations mentioned don’t apply. The body of  current 
grammatical description is certainly still dominated by languages from 
the Indo-european family, but detailed descriptions of  several east-
asian languages, languages from other families spoken in europe and 
its periphery (Finno-Ugric, Turkic, Semitic, Basque), and substantial 
amount of  grammatical description of  other languages from all over 
the planet. Therefore the null hypothesis would in most cases need to be 
VSHFLÀHGDVZKLFKLVWKHODQJXDJHRI FRPSDULVRQWKLVSKHQRPHQRQLQ
ODQJXDJH;LVOLNHDVSHFLÀFSKHQRPHQRQLQWKHVSHFLÀFEHWWHUVWXGLHG
ODQJXDJH<ZKHUHWKHÀHOGZRUNHUZRXOGQHHGWRWDNHFDUHWRGHWHUPLQH
WKH ULJKW FRPSDULVRQ ODQJXDJH< ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKHÀHOGZRUNHUZRXOG
also need to identify the phonetic content of  the lexical items. So, 
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WKHUHDUHVXIÀFLHQWFKHFNVEXLOWLQWRWKHFRPSDULVRQEDVHGDSSURDFKWR
ensure that erroneous claims of  the type that language x is like some 
well-studied language in some respect are not damagingly frequent. 
Furthermore claims of  the type language x is like language y rarely 
excite great interest, and therefore the greater burden of  proof  should 
be placed on the researcher claiming that language x and language 
y differ. The over-exoticizing approach, in my view, is more severely 
handicapped: it seems to start from the presumption that the humanity 
of  the indigenous group is in doubt and ends up all too frequently making 
false pronouncements of  language x lacking some property simply on 
WKHEDVLVRI WKHÀHOGZRUNHUQRWKDYLQJIRXQGSRVLWLYHHYLGHQFHIRUWKH
property in question. Given that claims of  this type incur great interest, 
WKHÀHOGVKRXOGQ·WUHO\RQDQDSSURDFKWKDWJHQHUDWHVDKLJKQXPEHURI 
false negatives of  this type.
,QVXP,KDYHDUJXHGWKDWFODLPVLQÀHOGZRUNRQLQGLJHQRXVODQJXDJH
should generally be taken to be ordinary if  they closely correspond to 
generalization established on the basis of  better studied languages. 
and one property of  an extra-ordinary claim is that it claims that an 
indigenous language diverges from the grammatical properties of  better 
studied languages. The resulting picture is different from one where it’s 
assumed as null-hypothesis that some grammatical factor always plays 
no role in the indigenous language. In addition the degree of  extra-
ordinariness depends on the hypothetical cost caused by an erroneous 
claim (a false positive) and that of  an erroneous rejection of  the same 
claim (a false negative). But this cost can not even be estimated at this 
point and the actual decisions depend largely on the social consensus 
RI WKHUHVHDUFKHUVLQWKHÀHOGJLYHQZKDWNLQGRI HYLGHQFHDUHRWKHUV
willing to revise their theoretical models to incorporate the new claim. In 
the following sections, I attempt to derive more practical consequences 
out of  these general philosophical principles.
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 &XUUHQW/LQJXLVWLF0HWKRGRORJ\
 (YLGHQFHIURP:HOO6WXGLHG/DQJXDJHV
This section summarizes the current state of  a debate about which is 
the most suitable method to gather acceptability judgments in one of  the 
best studied languages there is: english (GIBSOn and FedOrenkO 
2010, 2013, SPrOUSe and alMeIda 2013, SPrOUSe et al. 2013). 
The recent debate began with a broad accusation of  sloppiness 
against research using traditional “armchair” methods in syntactic and 
semantic research. But at least at this point, the result of  the debate 
is that quantitative evidence from formal experiments offers no better 
validity than evidence from the traditional “armchair” method. This 
is an important result to keep in mind also for linguistic work on less 
well-studied languages where also usually quantitative evidence is not 
collected.
GIBSOn and FedOrenkO   DFFXVH WKH ÀHOGV
of  syntax and semantics of  being open to researchers own cognitive 
ELDV DQG VSHFLÀFDOO\ D FRQÀUPDWLRQELDV LQ IDYRU WKH UHVHDUFKHUVRZQ
proposal. To support this claim they cite a couple of  selected, individual 
cases of  judgment data from the published literature that Gibson and 
Fedorenko failed to reproduce in quantitative studies involving multiple 
test conditions and multiple speakers. Gibson and Fedorenko therefore 
call for the widespread adoption of  quantitative research methods for 
syntax and semantics. Given the advances in software technology to 
conduct judgment elicitation over internet platforms such as amazon 
Mechanical Turk, they claim that the cost both in terms of  researchers 
time and payment of  participant would be worth the putative gain in 
accuracy. SPrOUSe and alMeIda (2013) and SPrOUSe et al. (2013), 
however, show that Gibson and Fedorenko themselves are guilty of  a 
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violation of  one basic of  method of  quantitative research: they don’t 
consider a random sample of  data in their evaluation of  the “armchair” 
research method, but instead focus on a few selected cases of  data that 
were already known to be controversial. SPrOUSe et al. (2013) present 
an evaluation of  the “armchair” method based on a randomized selection 
of  data from journal articles. They report that 95% of  the contrasts 
LQDFFHSWDELOLW\WKH\WHVWHGDUHFRQÀUPHGE\TXDQWLWDWLYHPHDVXUHPHQW
using amazon Mechanical Turk. This means that the “armchair” method 
is at least comparable concerning the number of  false positives it results 
in than the standard method of  behavioral psychology. The failed 
FRQÀUPDWLRQRI RI WKHFRQWUDVWVLQWKHTXDQWLWDWLYHWULDOVPD\VLJQDO
that there is indeed some small mismatch, but at this point it remains 
open as to whether these are false positives of  the “armchair” method or 
false negatives of  the quantitative method. Overall this result entails that 
H[LVWLQJUHVXOWVDQGPHWKRGVLQWKHÀHOGDUHQRWXQGHUPLQHGE\WKHZLGHU
availability of  experimental methods, but experimental methods are still 
important as they allow research on many questions that couldn’t be 
addressed by the “armchair” method. also for surprising, extraordinary 
new claims there could be an advantage to providing stronger evidence 
as expected by Sagan’s principle.
7KHÀQGLQJRI SPrOUSeHWDOLVLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHÀHOGZRUN
since it shows that currently most contrasts of  acceptability relevant to 
linguistic theory are such strong effects that they can be reliably judged 
without resort to quantitative methods at least by trained linguists. There 
are some difference though that remain to be investigated: In most 
ÀHOGZRUNVLWXDWLRQVWKHEXONRI GDWDZLOOEHFROOHFWHGQRWIURPWUDLQHG
linguists, but from between one and a couple of  language consultants. 
also while most interested researcher (e.g. the reviewers of  a paper) 
can readily attempt to reproduce english judgments, this is in most 
cases impossible for indigenous languages. In the following section, I 
FRQVLGHUH[LVWLQJUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUWKHPHWKRGRORJ\RI ÀHOGZRUN 
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and the implications of  the wider availability of  documentation and 
experimental techniques.
 (YLGHQFHIRU/HVV:HOO6WXGLHG/DQJXDJHV
,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ , ÀUVW IRFXV RQ WZR UHFHQW FRQWULEXWLRQV RQ WKH
PHWKRGRORJ\ RI  ÀHOG ZRUN RQ OHVV ZLGHO\ VSRNHQ ODQJXDJHV E\ WZR
SURPLQHQW UHVHDUFKHUV LQ WKH ÀHOG MaTThewSOn (2004) and 
dIxOn (2007). The two approaches represent two opposite ends of  
a spectrum of  opinion (and therefore are exemplary for other’s views 
RI RWKHUVLQWKHÀHOGZKLOH'L[RQXUJHVDQDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQ
the collection of  texts in the target language, Matthewson advocates 
in addition the use of  elicitation, of  translation and use of  a contact 
ODQJXDJH LQ WKH ÀHOG %XW QHLWKHU RI  WKH WZR H[SOLFLWO\ DGGUHVVHV WKH
LVVXHRI IRUPDOH[SHULPHQWV7KHJRDORI WKHVHFWLRQLVWRGHIHQGEULHÁ\
again the liberal view of  Matthewson, but in addition to indicate some 
VSDFHZKHUH IRUPDO H[SHULPHQWV VKRXOGEHDGGHG WR WKHÀHOGZRUNHUV
inventory. 
First, consider the recommendations dIxOn (2007) offers. while 
dixon’s paper contains more general advice on the practical aspects 
RI  ÀHOGZRUN D VXEVWDQWLDO SDUW RI  KLV SDSHU FRQFHUQVPHWKRGRORJ\
here, the focus on collecting texts is very explicit in dixon’s section 
9 on “what to do”. dixon focuses on three tasks: beginning to speak 
the language, compiling a dictionary, and recording and analyzing texts. 
The list doesn’t mention grammatical elicitation, and dixon states at 
the end of  the section (p. 23) that grammatical elicitation “should play 
no role whatsoeverLQOLQJXLVWLFÀHOGZRUNµHPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO$OVRRQ
p. 22, dixon writes that “the only way to understand the grammatical 
structure of  a language is to analyse recorded texts in that language.” 
Furthermore, in a later section on “what not to do” (p. 27), dixon 
reiterates that controlled elicitation shouldn’t be pursued. 
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dixon’s view as far as I can gather is extremist and Matthewson 
mentions many researchers who have taken a different stand. 
1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHH[WUHPLVWWH[WVRQO\YLHZVWLOOUHPDLQVLQÁXHQWLDOLQWKH
ÀHOG%XWWKHUHDUHPDQ\SUREOHPVZLWKWKHH[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQFROOHFWLQJ
texts. One general problem of  corpus based linguistics is that it neither 
REWDLQVXQJUDPPDWLFDOVHQWHQFHVQRUVHQWHQFHVWKDWDUHIDOVHLQDVSHFLÀF
scenario. Given the important role these types of  data play in linguistic 
DQDO\VLVWKHWH[WRQO\YLHZLVSURQHWRDODUJH7\SH,,HUURUQRWÀQGLQJ
GDWDWKDWZRXOGDFWXDOO\VKRZLQWHUHVWLQJGLVWLQFWLRQV&RQVLGHUEULHÁ\
two examples that illustrate the error-proneness of  a text-only strategy. 
7KHÀUVWH[DPSOHLVDFWXDOO\IURPVSRNHQ(QJOLVK6SRNHQ(QJOLVKLVQ·W
DEDGSUR[\IRUDQLQGLJHQRXVODQJXDJHLQDÀHOGZRUNVFHQDULRZKLFK
likely doesn’t have a written form, but at the same time english is well 
studied. ThOMPSOn (2002) looks at evidence for complement clauses 
in spoken english corpora, and concludes that rather than complement 
clauses, spoken english only allows unembedded declaratives 
accompanied by an evidential phrase. To support her claim, Thompson 
extracted a sample of  452 complement-taking predicates from a corpus 
of  spoken english and analyzed the structure and discourse contribution 
of  each item in detail. newMeyer (2010) points out that Thompson 
committed a Type II error: concluding from the lack of  evidence, that 
VRPHWKLQJGRHVQ·WH[LVW6SHFLÀFDOO\1HZPH\HUORRNVDWDPXFKODUJHU
corpus of  english than Thompson did: 170 Megabytes of  text data, 
DQG ÀQGV QXPHURXV GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RI  HYLGHQFH IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH RI 
complement clauses in english. what is instructive here is the amount 
of  text required to avoid a Type II error: For which indigenous language 
has anybody gathered and transcribed 170 Megabytes of  data? If  one 
page of  text corresponds to 500 Bytes (characters), then 170 Megabytes 
correspond to 340 thousand pages of  text: dixon’s text-only approach 
UHTXLUHV WKH ÀHOGZRUNHU WR JDWKHU URXJKO\ WZR ERRNVKHOYHV IXOO RI 
transcribed stories required to determine whether a language has 
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complement clauses or not. at the same time, the text-only approach 
is not immune to errors of  the Type I type. In fact, once a linguist is 
actually immersed in a collection of  texts and their translations, it seems 
WR EHFRPH GLIÀFXOW WR GLVFHUQ VSHFLÀF VXUSULVLQJ SURSHUWLHV RI  WKH
language under investigation. an example indicating that type of  failure 
to see an obvious linguistic difference to widely spoken languages in a 
text that was widely studied both in original and in translation concerns 
homeric Greek. as deUTSCher (2011) renarrates, the fact that the 
color categories of  homeric Greek don’t correspond to color categories 
of  english, German, French and other modern european languages 
was only pointed out by GladSTOne (1858: 457-499). Gladstone 
slightly overinterpreted the data (he assumed color vision was different 
at homer’s time), but given the modern knowledge of  cross-linguistic 
variation in color terms Gladstone’s basic observation was essentially 
correct, though overlooked by almost all others studying homer’s 
ZULWLQJ , GRQ·W WKLQNZH FDQEH FRQÀGHQW WKDW VLPLODU RYHUVLJKWV FDQ
be ruled out if  linguistics was to rely entirely on the text-only method. 
7ZRIDFWRUVPD\OHDGÀHOGZRUNHUVWRRYHUORRNLQWHUHVWLQJJUDPPDWLFDO
properties in texts: For one, since the gathered texts are usually stories, 
ÀHOG ZRUNHUV PD\ DWWULEXWH XQXVXDO SURSHUWLHV WR PHWDSKRULF XVH RU
poetic language as was the case for homeric Greek, but one Gladstone 
argues to be incorrect. Secondly, relevant data in texts may be spread 
out very thinly over different stories, and may only be convincing when 
arranged into one paradigm. This probably was less of  a factor in the 
case of  homer since many researchers intensively studied his writing, 
EXWLWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWFRQFHUQIRUWH[WVJDWKHUHGLQÀHOGZRUN1HHGOHVVWR
say the very successful typological research on color terms by BerlIn 
& kay (1969) didn’t rely on text corpora at all.
In sum, the text-only approach is prone to a large number of  Type 
II errors and even then may not generally lead to a full view of  the 
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language under investigation. a third concern about the approach is that 
LWPLJKWOHDGÀHOGZRUNHUVWRQRWGRFXPHQWDODUJHSDUWRI ZKDWWKH\GR
I have always found it very natural to construct an example sentence in 
a language I’m interested in and then ask a native speaker of  whether it’s 
grammatical and what it means. I can’t imagine that other linguists differ 
in this respect, even those who subscribe to the text-only view. In fact, 
'L[RQ·VPDQXDOXUJHVWKHÀHOGZRUNHUWROHDUQWKHLQGLJHQRXVODQJXDJH
and try to use it in conversation. Furthermore, he says it’s important 
“to encourage people to correct all your mistakes” (p. 20), which is very 
close to judgment elicitation: tell me whether what I say is grammatically 
correct and whether it’s true in this scenario. The major difference here 
LVWKDW'L[RQGRHVQ·WH[KRUWWKHÀHOGUHVHDUFKHUWRGRFXPHQWH[FKDQJHV
of  this type, while I consider this at least as important to document such 
judgement-elicitation sessions as stories and other texts: Only if  other 
UHVHDUFKHUVKDYHDFFHVVWRDOO WKHGDWDDÀHOGZRUNHU·VFRQFOXVLRQVDUH
based on (including the ungrammatical sentences), can they evaluate the 
arguments and it is this independent scrutiny that underpins progress 
LQ WKH ÀHOG )XUWKHUPRUH LQ VXFK MXGJPHQW HOLFLWDWLRQ VHVVLRQV DOO
important grammatical sentences should be recorded from at least one 
native speaker.
MaTThewSOn (2004) is primarily concerned with semantic 
ÀHOGZRUN7KHGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQV\QWDFWLFVHPDQWLFDQGSUDJPDWLF
ÀHOGZRUNDUHQ·WJHQHUDOO\HDV\WRGUDZWKRXJKDQG0DWWKHZVRQ·VSDSHU
FRQWDLQVDORWRI LQVLJKWVUHOHYDQWWRWKHVHRWKHUVXEÀHOGV0DWWKHZVRQ
like me takes a strong stance against the text-only approach. She in 
particular argues that the use of  a contact language (she uses the term 
“meta-language”) and of  translations in elicitation need to be handled 
with care, but need not be detrimental. One recent example of  the latter 
from work on Matses I was involved in is presented by MUnrO et al. 
(2012): we investigated the claim that Matses doesn’t have a form of  
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speech report corresponding exactly what is indirect speech in english 
and also in Spanish. as part of  a controlled elicitation experiment, we 
asked Matses speakers who also spoke Spanish to translate sentences 
with indirect speech from Spanish into Matses. In this experiment, we 
might have easily ended up with data that show transfer effects from 
Spanish into Matses. however, actually eight of  the nine speakers gave 
Matses responses that fully corresponded to the claim that Matses only 
has forms similar to direct speech in Spanish. The ninth speaker, who did 
show a transfer from Spanish to Matses, was working as a Spanish teacher. 
So, the example illustrates the potential for transfer effects involved in 
translation tasks, but at the same time the evidence obtained is actually 
revealing when speakers overcome the potential for grammatical transfer 
inherent in translation tasks. Overall, Matthewson’s liberal approach is 
on the right track in attempting to strike a balance between attempting 
to block false positives, but at the same time not impose unreasonable 
methodological barriers that impede progress and cause a large number 
of  false negatives simply because research methods commonly used for 
widely spoken languages are banned for indigenous languages.
One topic Matthewson doesn’t address is the use of  formal 
H[SHULPHQWVLQÀHOGZRUN$V,GLVFXVVHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQWKHUH
is no general, precise answer to this question until we know the cost 
of  having different types errors in our linguistic theory. If  one is too 
VNHSWLFDO RQH ZRXOG HQG XS VSHQGLQJ D ORW RI  ÀHOG ZRUN WLPH DQG
effort for results that could’ve been obtained with equal accuracy in an 
easier way. The satisfactory reliability of  the “armchair” method shows 
that not every formal experiment is warranted. On the other hand, 
if  one doesn’t undertake the effort of  a formal experiment when it’s 
due, one may easily miss an opportunity to convince the community 
of  an observation that is extraordinary in Sagan’s sense. There can’t be 
DJHQHUDODQVZHUWRZKHQIRUPDOH[SHULPHQWVFRXOGDGGWRÀHOGZRUN
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results, even assuming that the experiment if  properly designed and 
FDUULHG RXW2QH H[DPSOH ZKHUH D QRQH[SHULPHQWDO ÀHOGZRUN UHVXOW
has been ignored and this lack of  reception is possibly due to non-
experimental nature is provided by Matthewson’s own work on lillooet 
Salish. MaTThewSOn  SURSRVHV RQ WKH EDVLV RI  ÀHOGZRUN
that St’át’imcets lacks presuppositions of  the type that english has 
which place a requirement on the common ground (STalnaker, 
1973 among others). She proposes that instead St’át’imcets can mark 
content as objective propositional content in the sense of  GaUker 
(1998). To argue for this parameter Matthewson cites, on the one hand, 
unpublished experimental work by COnTI (1999), which I couldn’t 
access, and published work by herself  (MaTThewSOn et al. 2001) 
on english, and, on the other hand, reports on an informal experiment 
FRQGXFWHG LQ WKH ÀHOG IRU 6W·iW·LPFHWVMaThewSOn (2001, 2006) 
relies on the frequency of  presupposition challenging responses to test 
IRU SUHVXSSRVLWLRQDOLW\ 6SHFLÀFDOO\ VKH WHVWHG DGXOW (QJOLVK VSHDNHUV
on the presupposition of  (1) that there is in elephant in your hair isn’t 
VDWLVÀHGDQGIRXQGWKDWRI WKHPFKDOOHQJHZLWKDSKUDVHOLNH
“what elephant?” or similar.
(1) did you get the elephant out of  your hair?
In 2006, Matthewson claims that St’át’imcets adults don’t challenge 
what might appear to be presuppositions in the same way. For example, 
she reports on presenting the sentence in (2) to one of  her consultants. 
The english translation of  (2) presupposes that some other person’s 
being in jail was mentioned before, but Matthewson reports that her 
St’át’imcets informant didn’t challenge this response, but only asked 
what lisa did to land her in jail. Matthweson takes this to be evidence 
that “t’it” in (2) doesn’t trigger a presupposition of  the same type as 
english presuppositions, though it has the same semantic content.
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(2) wá7 W·LWl-ti gélgel-a tsitcw k lisa 
 be also in-deT strong-deT house deT lisa 
 ‘lisa is also in jail.’
as far as I know Matthewson’s claim has been largely ignored in the 
ÀHOG2QHFXUUHQW WKHPH LQZRUNRQSUHVXSSRVLWLRQ HJaBrUSan 
2011) is to attempt to derive that some aspects of  content must be 
presuppositional from general pragmatic and semantic principles. But 
if  MaTThewSOn (2006) is correct, that enterprise would be futile 
since the parametric difference between english and St’át’imcets shows 
that the presuppositionality of  some content is an arbitrary feature of  
DVSHFLÀFODQJXDJHOLNH(QJOLVKDQGRWKHUODQJXDJHVFDQGLIIHU,WKLQN
the reason Matthewson’s work has been ignored is that the evidence 
she present has not been as extraordinary as the claim Matthewson 
is making, and she should’ve done a more formal experiment on the 
matter. That Matthewson’s claim is extraordinarily surprising is in this 
case clear: MaTThewSOn (2006) writes herself  that her claim is 
“somewhat radical” (p. 63). her 2006 generalization also differs from 
her previous 1998 work, where she writes (p. 116) that “the lexical 
item corresponding to english ‘too’ induces presuppositions”2.
I conclude therefore that Matthewson should have done formal 
experimental work to corroborate the central claims of  her 2006 work. 
6SHFLÀFDOO\ RQH NLQG RI  VWXG\ WKDW FRPHV WR PLQG LV WKH IROORZLQJ
Matthewson compares the performance of  english adults on (1) with 
that of  St’át’imcets adults on (2). But neither the two groups nor the 
two sentences are very similar: as for the two groups, MaTThewSOn 
(2006) writes that her consultants “My relationship with the consultants 
from whom data were obtained is a friendly one, and I have known each of  
2 MaTThewSOn  SURSRVHV WKDW GHWHUPLQHUV LQ 6DOLVK ODQJXDJHV DQG VSHFLÀFDOO\
St’át’imcets cannot be presuppositional, consistent with the 2006 claim. Furthermore, she does 
preface the discussion I quote from in the text with the proviso that the full investigation of  the 
relevant claims is beyond the scope of  her 1998 work.
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the consultants for between 12 and 14 years.” (p. 68). MaTThewSOn 
et al. (2001) don’t report who the english adult subjects were that gave 
the 62% challenge-responses, but quite likely they were undergraduate 
students at the University of  Massachusetts. If  this is correct, there 
appear to be substantial differences in age, level of  education, and 
familiarity with the experimenter between the two groups. as for the 
sentences, a more appropriate comparison would’ve been between (2) 
and its english translation. If  a simple formal experiment controlling 
these two factors better corroborated them, it would certainly have 
brought broader recognition to MaTThewSOn’S (2006) results.
2YHUDOOWKRXJKWKHREVHUYDWLRQDOPHWKRGKDVVHUYHGWKHÀHOGTXLWH
well. Though some regard Galileo’s experiments as the starting point 
of  modern science, many big discoveries in science weren’t based on 
experiments, but only on close observation of  nature. Consider just one 
RI WKHPRVW LQÁXHQWLDOPRGHUQVFLHQWLÀFWKHRULHV'DUZLQ·VWKHRU\RI 
evolution. almost the entire body of  evidence for evolution that darwin 
based his theory comes from observations. darwin wasn’t opposed to 
experiments -- late in his life, he proved experimentally that earthworms 
improve the fertility of  soil --, but darwin did not waste any time on 
establishing obvious facts underpinning his account of  evolution such 
as the anatomy of  the Galapagos fauna, and at his time of  writing also 
GLGQ·WKDYHWKHPHWKRGVDWKLVGLVSRVDOWRVHHNH[SHULPHQWDOFRQÀUPDWLRQ
of  evolution. linguists too need to develop a taste for when quantitative 
data are useful, and when they are an impediment to progress.
 &RQFOXVLRQ:KHQWRIRUPDOO\H[SHULPHQWLQWKHÀHOG"
To conclude, I take stock and attempt to derive some practical 
recommendations. It is impossible, though, to derive a precise general 
recommendation from the above considerations as to when to do a 
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formal experiment and when it would be a waste of  time. Clear cases 
of  former are any cases where experiments are also called for for well-
studied languages: cases where the data are subtle, cases where additional 
measurements such as timing data or neurological data are expected to 
be revelatory, and cases where groups other than adult informants are 
under investigation. Clear cases of  the latter are data that trust-worthy 
language consultants judge to be clear and that conform to patterns 
of  a better studied language. That leaves a large area where it is up to 
the individual researchers judgment whether experiments are expected 
WR DGG WR WKH UHOLDELOLW\ RI  WKH ÀQGLQJV %XW , WKLQN WKHUH LV HQRXJK
PRWLYDWLRQWRVXJJHVW WKDW UHVHDUFKHUVHQJDJHG LQÀHOGZRUNVKRXOGDW
least consider and acquire the ability to perform formal, quantitative 
experiments. especially this should be the case in situations where 
IRUPDO H[SHULPHQWV FDQ EH LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR WKH ÀHOGZRUN VLWXDWLRQ
without being taking away a large amount of  time from other methods 
like judgment elicitation and story elicitation.
Compared to the investigation of  well-studied languages the situation 
IRU ÀHOGZRUN LV GLIIHUHQW LQ VHYHUDO ZD\V 2QH UHFHQW WHFKQRORJLFDO
advance in the case of  well-studied languages has been the availability 
of  the internet based platforms that allow researchers to conduct 
trials, especially amazon’s Mechanical Turk (a point of  GIBSOn & 
FedOrenkO’S 2010 paper that I discussed above in section 2.1). The 
internet based methods make it possible to conduct quantitative trials 
for researchers that don’t have access to lab space and research assistants 
that gather judgment data from a large group of  english speakers. But, 
speakers of  any indigenous language are unlikely to be available on 
Mechanical Turk -- even for German and Japanese I found it impossible 
to get more than about 40 native speakers in a study conducted in 2011. 
%XWLQWHJUDWLQJIRUPDOH[SHULPHQWVLQWRÀHOGZRUNDOVREHQHÀWVLQVRPH
ways from recent technological progress and furthermore offers some 
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distinct advantages. The two ways technological progress make it easier 
WRFRQGXFWIRUPDOH[SHULPHQWVLQWKHÀHOGDUHWKHIROORZLQJ)RURQH
smaller and cheaper equipment make it possible to create and manipulate 
UHFRUGLQJVDQGRWKHUGDWDLQWKHÀHOGWRVHWXSDQH[SHULPHQW6HFRQGO\
freely available, public domain software tools facilitate both the creation 
of  stimuli and analysis of  data from formal experiments. For the analysis, 
especially the Praat software for phonetic analysis and the r software 
for statistical analysis and the creation of  graphs can nowadays replace 
expensive commercial software such as SPSS for research purposes.
Still it costs time to prepare and conduct formal experiments to gather 
TXDQWLWDWLYHGDWDLQWKHÀHOG%XWWKHUHDQXPEHURI LPSRUWDQWUHDVRQVWR
consider doing so in selected circumstances. The typical scenario I have 
LQPLQGKHUH LVRQHZKHUH LQLWLDOÀHOGZRUNXVLQJ MXGJPHQWHOLFLWDWLRQ
has already provided evidence in favor of  the conclusions that a formal 
experiment then attempts to corroborate. Of  course there are also cases 
ZKHUHMXGJPHQWHOLFLWDWLRQLVQ·WXVHIXOLQWKHÀUVWSODFHDVZLWKTXHVWLRQV
of  traditional psycholinguistics and experiments are needed to establish 
any useable evidence. But even in cases where language consultants 
judgment provide some evidence, there may be reasons to conduct in 
addition a formal experiment. The foremost reason is that the evidence 
and the conclusions drawn from it are surprising, for example they may 
contradict apparently well-established generalizations in linguistics. If  this 
is the case, the simplest possible experiment would be to independently 
question several additional members of  the community. after all, if  all 
ÀYHRXWRI ÀYHLQGLYLGXDODJUHHWKDWDFRQWUDVWJRHVWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQ
WKLV HVWDEOLVKHV VWDWLVWLFDO VLJQLÀFDQFH E\ WKH ELQRPLDO WHVW $ VHFRQG
good reason may be that in situations of  language endangerment the 
evidence might not be available later. So it may be the last chance to 
document any property of  such a language with greater reliability. a 
related third reason is that in situations where an indigenous language 
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is not the main daily language of  most members of  a community 
anymore, individual consultants judgement may be more uncertain than 
otherwise, or it may be desirable to determine whether all members of  
the community share the relevant judgment. For example, in work of  
my own with the Teiwa in Indonesia (kratochvil, hollebrandse, and 
Sauerland, in progress), we primarily worked with younger speakers as 
consultants. however, younger speakers were all literate in Indonesian 
and we turned to experimental techniques to determine whether older, 
illiterate speakers shared the relevant judgments. a fourth advantage of  
LQWHJUDWLQJVRPHH[SHULPHQWDOZRUNLQÀHOGVLWXDWLRQVLVWKDWLWFDQLQYROYH
all members of  the community, while typically one works every day with 
the some preferred consultants in judgment elicitation who gain some 
SURÀFLHQF\DQGDOVRQRWDOOFRPPXQLW\PHPEHUVYROXQWHHUWRWHOOVWRULHV
to be recorded. In this situation, enrolling all comers as participants in 
an experiment and providing some appropriate compensation for the 
effort is a way to engage the whole community in the study and receive 
VRPHLPPHGLDWHEHQHÀW)RUWKLVLWLVKHOSIXOLI WKHH[SHULPHQWLVQRW
too hard, but rather fun for the participants, so I offer some simple 
methods in the following.
For work in syntax and semantics, simple methods are focused on 
the task of  either judging that one sentence sounds better (i.e. more 
grammatical) than another, or that one sentence is more acceptable 
LQDVSHFLÀFVLWXDWLRQ,W LVDOVRRIWHQKHOSIXOWR ORRNDWZRUNGRQHLQ
language acquisition research with children since materials for children 
must be designed to be engaging. Of  course, one shouldn’t overdo this: 
infantilizing is no better received by members of  an indigenous community 
than by adults elsewhere. It also is helpful to ask the community or the 
consultants one works with closely for suggestions on how to do this. My 
own experience comes from work on Teiwa mentioned above, Matses 
(MUnrOe et al. 2012), and Pirahã (Sauerland, to appear). The methods 
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that are most easily and broadly applicable: we essentially compiled a list 
of  testable examples working with a few primary informants. The list 
consisted primarily of  questions of  the type, can this sentence be used 
in this scenario? after the list was done, we went around with it and 
asked other speakers the questions on the list, and just reported their 
responses. In addition we did another experiment involving translations 
from Spanish into Matses. In the case of  Teiwa and Pirahã, the goal was 
different from the one in Matses. For both languages, it was unclear 
LI VSHFLÀFVFHQDULRVQDPHO\IDOVHEHOLHI VFHQDULRVFRXOGEHGHVFULEHG
in the language at all. In this case, we followed language acquisition 
research by using targeted elicitation: we created relevant scenarios and 
asked speakers to report relevant aspects of  that scenario. So this was 
spontaneous production in a controlled situation. If  it works, the results 
from this method provide strong evidence for the existence of  the 
VSHFLÀFVWUXFWXUHVVSHDNHUVXVHLQWKLVVFHQDULRVLQFHVSHDNHUVSURGXFH
them spontaneously. But the work required especially for the evaluation 
is much greater, than in acceptability or comprehension studies, and 
additional comprehension experiments seemed necessary to me in 
ERWKRI P\FDVHVWRFRQÀUPWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ7KLVH[DPSOHVLOOXVWUDWH
WKDW LI  IRUPDO H[SHULPHQWV DUHZDUUDQWHG LQ WKHÀUVWSODFH WKHJRDOV
determine the best method and setup.
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